C.S. Supplies and Logistics
“Comrades, you will better grasp the relation Judas (Iscariot) bore to the other Apostles when I tell you he was the Quartermaster of the company.” (4th Virginia chaplain in Ted Barclay, Liberty Hall Volunteers: Letters from the Stonewall Brigade (1861-1864), editor Charles W. Turner, Rockbridge 1992).
One of the variables that affected the Civil War’s outcome was the Confederate government’s inability to supply and support the army in the field. It is a simple fact that the mobilization of farms, factories, foundries, financial institutions and transportation must accompany the mobilization of men, as noted in the July 1917 American Historical Review. Just as a trained army cannot be created without properly trained officers, the resources of a nation cannot be organized for effective military use if there is no body of trained supply officers to conduct the mobilization. The role of the quartermaster, which was different in the army and navy, is perhaps the widest-ranging function in the military. The name “quartermaster” derives from the German word quartiermeister, literally meaning an officer whose role was to prepare the sleeping quarters for the ruler. The word evolved so that in the 17th century it encompassed the entire support role of organizing and supplying provisions to the army. In the United States, the Quartermaster Department is the oldest logistics branch, dating from a resolution passed by the Second Continental Congress in mid-1775. A Quartermaster General heads the Quartermaster Department. At the start of the war that was Montgomery C. Meigs in the U.S. Army and Abraham Myers in the Confederate States. Myers was replaced on Aug, 7, 1863, by Alexander Lawton, “in the interest of efficiency,” according to President Jefferson Davis. There is more to that story, including the bad relationship between Myers and Robert E. Lee going back to their old days in the U.S. Army. Much has been researched and written about the inferiority of the antebellum South’s industrial economy. It is often cited as a weakness in the supply of men and materiel for the Confederacy. Fair enough … however, what about imports? What if through importation of goods the Confederacy was actually well supplied? The recently published Entrepot by C. Lon Webster III (Edinborough Press 2009) makes a very good case that due to massive importation of supplies via blockade runners the Confederacy at times was better equipped than the invading Union Army, at least in terms of goods off-loaded into warehouses. The documentation provided in Entrepot is difficult to argue with. If the necessary goods were on hand, then what was the problem in getting these supplies delivered to Confederate troops? One possible reason for the Confederate Quartermaster Department’s failure may have been General Myers’ inability to grasp the transportation piece of the supply logistics puzzle. For reasons that defy rational explanation, he was not in favor of government control of the railroads. In fact, the Confederate railroad system was hardly regulated at all. It was not until late in 1862 that the rail system fell under the control of the Confederate Quartermaster Department. The failure was not with Myers alone. Every regiment had a quartermaster sergeant whose job was to see that the men in the field were supplied. There is an anecdotal story in Company Aytch where Sam Watkins is detailed to go to Georgia to purchase supplies for the Commissary of the Army of Tennessee. He calls it a “foraging expedition.” It may have been, but besides acting as a purchasing agent, the field quartermaster was also involved in cooperage (packing in crates) and drayage (conveyance by wagon) at stops along the way. Failure to adequately supervise these functions led to damage and spoilage of goods en route back to the army. The Official Records cite an 1864 incident where Gen. John Bell Hood had to destroy supplies of rolling stock “…owing to the wanton neglect of the Chief Quartermaster [Lt. Col. McMicken] of this Army [who] I am informed is too much addicted to drink of late to attend to his duties.” Besides the destruction of 28 carloads of ammunition and quartermaster’s stores, the cars and train engines were also destroyed, according to Hood’s report. Ammunition, as well as muskets, bayonets, slings and leather accoutrements, were the responsibility of the Ordnance Department hence this particular transportation fiasco crossed departmental lines.
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