In the Trenches at Petersburg—Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat
This is the author’s third volume dealing with the evolution of field fortifications during the war and essentially demonstrates the maturation of the armies in designing and implementing protective and offensive systems during Gen. U.S. Grant’s siege of Petersburg. In the early part of the war, such fortifications were rudimentary and transitory — useful only for a single engagement to protect the soldiers from an assault during short-lived campaigns throughout the Virginia countryside. But as the North’s philosophy of conducting war changed to one of investment and attrition, the character of those field fortifications changed as well. Coincidently, the soldiers themselves discovered the practical value of fieldworks for their own safety in this evolutionary process, regardless of their officers’ apprehension that emphasis on defense might well destroy the élan necessary for a successful assault. There was the feeling that such defensive works psychologically discouraged men from sallying forth into the face of enemy fire. By 1864, and with the notion that the Federals had to be in constant contact with the enemy regardless of the outcome of any engagement, Grant moved toward Petersburg to strangle the Army of Northern Virginia. Probably influenced by his experience at Vicksburg the previous year, he recognized that this would not be accomplished through a sweeping campaign, like those envisioned by his predecessors, but rather through a long process that was part of a larger framework, involving pressure on all fronts of the Confederacy. As the soldiers settled in around Petersburg, it was inevitable that sophisticated trenches with protective bombproofs and covered ways as well as abatis, palisades and chevaux de fries, which were the forerunners of barbed wire, became the norm. There were mine fields and even dams constructed to flood areas much like moats. The soldiers’ imaginations led to attempts to engage in offense. The most novel approach was the mine constructed by the Federals that culminated in the battle of the Crater. As Hess points out, it was not the only mine constructed. Both sides dug mines and countermines along the lines, testing weak points subterrestrially. Indeed, the pick and shovel replaced drill practice for much of the front-line soldier’s experience. Hess also describes life in the trenches and the erosion of earthworks and forts that required constant refurbishing as rains weathered the structures. These areas had to be policed so that the trenches did not become pits of contamination that bred disease. Perhaps the most interesting observation Hess advances is that Grant’s strategy was not to invest Petersburg through a siege in the traditional sense. Rather, Grant was more interested in pinning down his adversary through the use of fortifications while he moved along the flank in a series of offensive maneuvers and, in turn, fortified those positions one they were secured. In this way, Lee’s army had to move to match Grant’s, making Lee’s already tenuous line even weaker as it stretched out. Hess’ analysis of the Petersburg Campaign is really one describing nine Federal offensives and three Confederate ones, the latter done purely in self-defense as in the attack on Fort Stedman. Along with several Federal cavalry raids, these offensives made the campaign appear less static than is usually considered. Even so, at the end of the campaign the trenches stretched out for 35 miles over railroad tracks, rivers and major thoroughfares. There is no doubt that these field fortifications played a role in the final result of Grant’s strategy. This study is well documented and the maps delineate the placement of the fortifications. Period photographs show the nature of the works and appendices provide details about them then, in addition to what they are like today. Suffice to say that this book is more than a parochial discussion of fieldworks because it describes the engagements in the environs of Petersburg that provide a context for the engineering activities that necessarily followed. It is a fitting conclusion to the author’s other books dealing with field fortifications and serves as a unique perspective from which to analyze the war. Reviewer: Frank Piatek graduated from Geneva College with a B.A. in history. He received his J.D. from Duquesne University in 1972. He is a member of several reenactment groups and past president of the Mahoning Valley Civil War Round Table.
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Illustrated, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index, 403 pp., 2009. The University of North Carolina Press, 116 S. Boundary St., Chapel Hill, NC 27514-3808, $45 plus shipping.