The Battle of the Crater: The Civil War’s Cruelest Mission

By Alan Axelrod
Illustrated, appendix, notes, bibliography, index, 248 pp., 2007. Carroll & Graff Publishers/Perseus Books Group, 387 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016, $26.95 plus shipping.

Reviewer: Walt Albro
Walt Albro is a magazine writer and editor who lives in Rockville, Md.

Review:
Most of us think of the battle of the Crater as an historical curiosity — a minor battle based on a harebrained Union attack that ended in a fiasco.

In this book, author Alan Axelrod argues that the battle was more important than commonly believed. He claims that the attack, if executed as originally envisioned, would have won the war for the Union in July 1864 — 10 months prior to Appomattox.

The story begins as the Army of the Potomac starts its siege of Petersburg, Va., on June 19, 1864. Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants of the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry observed that a Confederate redoubt known as “Elliott’s Salient” was located a mere 130 yards from the Union trenches.

A former mining engineer, Pleasants realized it would be possible to tunnel under the redoubt and blow it up. Pleasants passed the idea up the chain of command to Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Ninth Corps, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac.

Burnside has little faith in Pleasants’ plan and viewed it primarily as a way of keeping his men occupied during the long and boring siege. Meade, in turn, had little faith in Burnside. This apathy appears to have undercut whatever possibility of success the scheme might have enjoyed.

Because of a lack of command support, the digging, which started on June 25, was done without the necessary tools, shoring lumber, or wheelbarrows to remove excavated dirt.

To lead the assault, Burnside had selected the Fourth Division, composed of black soldiers, because they were new to battle and therefore “fresh.” Meade forced Burnside to reverse this decision, believing that more experienced white troops should lead the attack. Meade contended that it might appear that the black troops were being used only because it was a dangerous mission.

Although the Fourth Division had already been trained for the assault, the black soldiers were reassigned at the last hour to a supporting role, and an untrained white division was selected by lot to lead the attack.

When the mine exploded on the morning of July 30, it blew up Elliott’s Salient just as Pleasants had planned and created a 200-yard gap in the Confederate line. Unfortunately the assault troops were not properly briefed on their objectives and were poorly led. The first wave walked — rather than ran — to the Crater and aimlessly loitered there during the critical first minutes.

The Confederates, stunned at first, enjoyed good leadership and quickly pulled themselves together. After an interval of 30 minutes, the Rebels resumed firing and launched counter-attacks.

As the firing intensified, many of the Union soldiers jumped into the Crater for cover. Since the 20-30-foot high crater walls were difficult to scale, many soldiers ended up trapped inside. Rebels ran to the lip of the pit and fired their muskets down inside. They also pulled up mortars and lobbed shells into the “horrid pit.”

By 2 p.m., it was clear that the Union assault had failed. The Confederates captured 1,400 men, including those trapped in the crater itself. And estimated 200 black soldiers were murdered after giving up their weapons and surrendering.

The disaster led to an Army Board of Inquiry as well as a Congressional investigation. Burnside took the brunt of the blame and soon lost his command.

What drives this book is the compelling subject matter. The author does a competent job of storytelling, and he offers provocative interpretations. His argument is weakened, however, by his failure to offer new primary information. The bibliography is heavily tilted toward secondary sources.

The diagrams of the tunnel are complete and understandable, but I felt handicapped by the lack of maps showing the post-explosion battle action.

Axelrod’s thesis is that Meade delayed the war’s end by his shortsighted refusal to allow black troops to spearhead the Crater assault. It’s an argument that’s hard to either prove or disprove. It also seems possible that the Crater is simply a symbol of the war’s horrors — and the extremes that both sides were willing to endure as part of the struggle.