Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign-March, 1862 to May, 1862

By Russel H. Beatie
Illustrated, index, bibliography, maps, 723 pp., 2007. Savas Beatie LLC, P.O. Box 4527, El Dorado Hills, Ca 95762, $45 plus shipping.

Reviewer: Kenneth D. Williams
Kenneth D. Williams is writing a book on the 11th Pennsylvania Volunteers and is doing doctoral level work in American history. He has worked as a park ranger at Gettysburg National Military Park and Eisenhower National Historic Site.

Review:
Russel 'Cap" Beatie is fast on his way to becoming the Douglas Southall Freeman of the Army of the Potomac. This is his third volume examining the history of this storied fighting group. The first two volumes covered events from the Secession winter of 1860-1861 to the end of the first winter of the war.

This new work covers the preparation and move to the Virginia peninsula and the subsequent siege of Yorktown to the Confederate retreat and the resulting battle of Williamsburg.

Covering only three months of war this volume's research and analysis is staggering. And it's almost exclusively oriented to the Federal side! Confederate actions and plans are only examined in light of reactions to Union moves. The bibliography stretches to 50-plus pages and 37 maps are sprinkled throughout the text. Few pages go by without at least one detailed footnote, yes footnotes, like the old days.

While Beatie's first two volumes are highly detailed, the emphasis was on setting up the organization and early strategy of the conflict. In this new book, Beatie dives headlong into the controversies surrounding the move to the Peninsula, political implications of military strategy and the Lincoln-McClellan relationship.

Beatie has been branded as pro-McClellan and, yes, he does offer reasoned arguments that McClellan faced numerous difficulties in adjusting to the political whirlwind that encompassed his every move.

McClellan does receive criticism at times for his actions, but it is Abraham Lincoln who comes in for the brunt of missteps as the President is seen as meddling, overeager to please his political base and easily swayed by others both in and out of the military establishment with personal agendas.

Great detail is given to the design and ultimate failure of McClellan's Urbanna plan, the division of the Army into corps with commanders not selected by McClellan and the controversy surrounding the number of troops available to defend Washington while the majority of the Army of the Potomac moved on Richmond.

The approach and siege of the Confederate works at Yorktown are described in considerable detail, especially as to the strength of the fortifications which is often overlooked in the rush to condemn McClellan in not using his numerical superiority.

The Federal naval forces and their commanders, both on the water and in Washington, are especially castigated for their timidity and obstruction of plans to use their considerable firepower in reducing the Southern stronghold. Finally, the disjointed and amateurish Federal attacks at Williamsburg are examined as a natural end-result of corps and divisional commanders being chosen for political expediency as opposed to battlefield prowess.

Beatie's latest volume is the product of Savas Beatie, a publishing house of which he is a part owner. Previous volumes were done by DaCapo Press.

The new book shows better editing and construction than the previous two, but a few annoying problems do appear. Some sentences can appear choppy and repetitive and small errors of fact and spelling can occur.

More illustrations/photographs might also have been used, only nine officer photographs appear in the dramatis personae. Overall, though, these are but quibbles in a work of massive research and analysis. You may well not agree with Beatie's interpretations but you will be intrigued and stimulated by them.