McClellan and Failure: A Study of Civil War Fear, Incompetence and Worse

By Edward H. Bonekemper III
Illustrated, maps, notes, bibliography, 212 pp., 2007. McFarland & Company, Box 611, Jefferson, NC 28640, $45 plus shipping.

Reviewer: Kenneth D. Williams
Kenneth D. Williams is writing a book on the 11th Pennsylvania Volunteers and is doing doctoral level work in American history. He has worked as a park ranger at Gettysburg National Military Park and Eisenhower National Historic Site.

Review:
George Brinton McClellan was a controversial and enigmatic commander from the moment he put on Union blue in 1861 up to this day. Most studies of the last 50 years have been unfavorable, although within the past five or so years there have appeared some more sympathetic ones. Edward Bonekemper's newest work, as its title proclaims, is anything but sympathetic.

Bonekemper, an attorney and lecturer in military history, is the author of two previous works concentrating on the military abilities of Civil War leaders. His How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War castigates the Southern leader's strategic and tactical vision while A Victor Not a Butcher: U.S. Grant, Overlooked Military Genius, lauds the Northern commander's abilities. The author states that writing those two works led him to examine the career of Little Mac.

Bonekemper relates McClellan's military career from the early days in the mountains of Western Virginia, through coming to Washington and the time as Commanding General of Union armies to the Peninsula Campaign and ending with Second Bull Run, Antietam and ultimate relief from active command. The focus is on military events so there is no discussion of McClellan's later role as Democratic presidential candidate.v The book makes use of McClellan's voluminous if often indiscreet correspondence as well as the large number of secondary works that have covered the general. A concluding historiographical chapter examines the major literature on the leader. A few maps that accompany the text illuminate various campaigns.

Bonekemper finds virtually nothing redeemable about McClellan, stating his dilatoriness and paranoia extended the Civil War by 2-3 years and that he engaged in borderline traitorous, if not, at times, outright traitorous behavior, especially in his dealings with Gen. John Pope. Bonekemper sees McClellan as consumed by a lust for fame and glory but almost paralyzed by an even greater fear of failure and acceptance of blame.

While definitely one-sided, Bonekemper presents his arguments in a reasoned and well-written format.

I would suggest reading his work, which, like most McFarland offerings, is well-bound and well-presented, but very pricey, in combination with a more "friendly" work such as Ethan Rafuse's recent McClellan's War or Thomas Rowland's study of a few years back.