Strangling the Confederacy:
Coastal Operations in the American Civil War

By Kevin Dougherty

(November 2010 Civil War News)

Bookmark and Share

Strangling the Confederacy: Coastal Operations in the American Civil War. By Kevin Dougherty. Illustrated, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 240 pp., 2010, Casemate, www.casematepublishing.com, $32.95.

This is a retelling of the story of the Union blockade of the Confederate seacoast. This volume describes the campaigns and expeditions to blockade the South and capture its coastal cities and various coastal areas (as well as the work of the Navy Board).

It compares them to the elements of modern operational design as practiced by the U.S. military and as defined and designated in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Navy Board, a four-member board consisting of members of both the Army and Navy, was convened in June 1861 to develop an effective means of implementing the Union blockade strategy.

Through its planning efforts and implementation by the navy and army, the Confederates’ lines of communications with Europe and the rest of the world were disrupted and important port cities and base areas were captured by the Union.

Thus, the blockade denied valuable resources to the Confederacy and compelled it to defend its coastal areas, thereby preventing those defensive forces from joining Confederate armies in areas threatened by Union armies.

The 18 elements of operational design (formerly known as the facets of operational art) specified by Joint Publication 3-0 are termination, end states and objectives, effects, center of gravity, decisive points, direct versus indirect, lines of operations, operational reach, simultaneity and depth, timing and tempo, forces and functions, leverage, balance, anticipation, synergy, culmination, arranging operations, and conclusion.

This book’s concluding chapter, “The Coastal War and the Elements of Operational Design,” discusses each of these elements and how they were applied or ignored, as well as how proper appreciation and adoption of each could have made a greater contribution to the Union effort.

This approach raises numerous Civil War “what-ifs,” such as what would have happened if the Union had used some of its bases on the coasts to push inland, cut railroads and make permanent lodgments in the Deep South. In addition, Dougherty’s analysis indicates Mobile, Ala., certainly could have, and should have, fallen a lot sooner than April 1865.

Strangling the Confederacy is an excellent short history of the blockade, its campaigns and expeditions, and its successes and failures. It is also an excellent exposition of how the elements of operational design for conducting warfare and their applications have not changed over time. The trick is how to apply them.

Dougherty has produced an interesting volume for someone who wants to learn about the Union blockade and for students of the Civil War’s grand strategy and operations. It is highly recommended for both.

Reviewer: Joseph A. Derie

Joseph A. Derie is a VMI graduate and a long time Civil War buff and military book reviewer. A retired Coast Guard officer and licensed officer of the Merchant Marine, he is a Certified Marine Investigator and marine surveyor.