The American Civil War: A Military History
After writing such classic works as The Face of Battle and A History of Warfare, British military historian John Keegan has now turned his knowledge and power of analysis to a volume about the American Civil War. His readers will not be disappointed, although some undoubtedly will dispute his conclusions. This is not a “history” in the normal sense. For one thing, it is too short, only 360 pages (although it does include a summary of all military campaigns and major battles). It is, rather, a study and analysis of the war, discussing the conditions that led to the fighting, the geographic problems that the generals contended with and the strategies employed — successfully as well as unsuccessfully. Also reviewed are the aspects of the war that were similar to other world conflicts and those that were unusual or unique. One key observation is that the Civil War was distinguished by the “ferocity” of its fighting. About 10,000 skirmishes or battles were fought between 1861 and 1865, an average of seven a day. This compares with Wellington’s experience in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars, where he fought on average one major battle a year. Keegan says the war was ferocious because it pitted two democracies against each other — democracies in which ordinary citizens were involved in the crucial political issues and were self-motivated to fight passionately for their cause. Another reason was that there were few traditional strategic targets. The South, for example, had little industry and few major cities. The North had both, but these vital assets were centered in New England or the Mid-Atlantic states far beyond the convenient reach of either the Confederate Army or Navy. In the war’s early stages, the influence of the Napoleonic Wars misled generals on both sides to seek a “great battle” such as Napoleon had won at Austerlitz or Marengo. When the great battle theory of victory proved elusive, the generals simply started targeting each others’ armies as the only convenient military objective. This led to a long, slow and painful war of attrition. Keegan gives Lee and Jackson their due as brilliant tacticians, but he argues that both lacked boldness of strategic vision. The true military innovators were Grant and Sherman, who concluded that the only real strategic target was the “Southern mind.” Once Grant and Sherman had crushed the Southern will to resist, the war ended, Keegan notes. Could the South have won? The South dissipated its strength by pursuing an offensive strategy early in the war, but a purely defensive approach would simply have delayed the inevitable. Recognition of the South by Great Britain and France was never in the cards. The North had too much manpower, weapons and money for the South to prevail. Lee wisely disdained a guerrilla war. It would have led to more death and destruction in the South without altering the ultimate outcome. Keegan places the Civil War in the context of world military history and provides some international perspective on an important event that has been interpreted mostly by American-born historians. A third-party perspective by a well-read and objective writer is provocative and instructive. This book is a welcome addition to Civil War literature. Reviewer: Walt Albro
Walt Albro is a magazine writer and editor who lives in Rockville, Md.
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Illustrated, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 360 pp., 2009. Alfred A. Knopf, 201 E 50th St., New York, NY 10022, www.aaknopf.com, $35 plus shipping.